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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Any one of the five following bases is independently 
sufficient to mandate reversal of the summary judgment entered by 
the trial court: 
1. Reversal is mandated since Daniel Farris (Farris) 
failed to carry his burden as the moving party described in the 
case of Walker Drug Co., Inc. v. La Sal Oil Co. , 902 P.2d 1229 
(Utah 1995). This burden was not eliminated by reason of 
McNair's response. 
2. Reversal is mandated since Leslie Scot McNair 
(McNair) could rely on his pleadings in accordance with Gadd 
v^ Olson, 685 P.2d 1041 (Utah 1984). 
3. Reversal is mandated since McNair's deposition 
showed there existed a genuine issue of material fact. 
4. Reversal is mandated since McNair had until trial to 
present expert testimony, no pretrial or discovery order having 
been entered or violated. 
5. Reversal is mandated since the dismissal should not 
have been with prejudice. 
The first of these bases is addressed in connection with 
Farris's burden. The middle three bases are addressed in 
connection with McNair's response to the motion. The last is 
addressed lastly and separately. 
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ARGUMENT 
1. JN MOVING FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, FARRIS DID NOT 
CARRY, NOR WAS HE EXCUSED FROM CARRYING, HIS BURDEN OF PRESENTING 
EVIDENCE THAT THERE WAS NO GENUINE ISSUE REGARDING THE NO-FAULT 
THRESHOLD. 
In Farrisfs Brief, he does not dispute the following two 
points made by McNair in his brief: (1) Farris did not supply an 
affidavit showing that there was no permanent disability or 
permanent impairment based upon objective findings; and (2) 
Farris's initial burden as the moving party was no less at a 
pretrial held shortly before trial than at any other time. 
Rather, Farris argues only that his burden as the moving 
party was met when he "pointed out" to the court that McNair had 
established no evidence to show such permanent disability or 
impairment. Brief of Appellee (Farris Brief) at 7-8. 
Federal cases would require Farris to do more than "point out" an 
absence of evidence adduced, 
Farris cites Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 
S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) as supporting his position that 
he did enough when he "pointed out" to the court that McNair had 
not produced evidence of permanent disability. In particular, he 
cites language of that case holding that Rule 56 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure does not require the moving party to 
support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials 
negating the opponents claims. Farris Brief at 7. 
However, it is well to look at what the moving party did 
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in the Celotex case. The case involved a wrongful death claim 
against a manufacturer of asbestos products. The manufacturer 
had pursued discovery. In answer to interrogatories, the 
claimant had not been able to identify any witness or any other 
potential source of competent evidence to show that the decedent 
had ever been exposed to manufacturer's asbestos products. The 
manufacturer moved for summary judgment on this basis. 
What more could the manufacturer have done in 
preparation for the motion? There were no witnesses identified 
for it to depose. In factf had witnesses been identified, the 
manufacturer would clearly have had to do more: 
Petitioner Celotex does not dispute that 
if respondent has named a witness to supoort 
her claim, summary judgment should not be 
granted without Celotex somehow showing that 
the named witness1 possible testimony raises no 
genuine issue of material fact. I_d. 477 
U.S. at 328, 106 S.Ct. at 2555 (White, J., 
concurring). 
In the instant matter, Farris had no such difficulties 
in preparing for his motion. McNair himself was obviously a 
witness. He had been deposed, but Farris did not even refer to 
the deposition, let alone quote parts pertinent to the motion. 
Furthermore, Farris did not have to wait to see what 
witnesses McNair might identify. He could have had McNair submit 
to a medical examination under Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure (URCP). 
Finally, McNair had given Farris records identifying 
doctors who had already attended to him. Record at (R.) 78, 157, 
163. No reference to these doctors nor to their ooinions was 
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made in Farris's motion, because no effort had been made to 
contact them or find out their opinions. 
Farris points out that there was over one year of 
discovery. Farris Brief at 4. Thus Farris had over one year to 
gather information in order to carry his burden as the moving 
party. Nevertheless, he did not do so. He should have waited 
until trial, when McNair would have had the burden of proof. 
The Celotex Court pointed out that language from the 
case of Adickes v. S.H. Kress St Co. , 398 U.S. 144, 159, 90 S.Ct. 
1598, 1609, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970) should not have been construed 
to require such a heavy burden on the moving party. However, the 
Celotex opinion agreed that the facts of that case showed the 
moving party had not carried its burden. Celotex, supra, 477 
U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. at 2554. 
Adickes involved a civil rights action where it was part 
of the prima facie case to show that some action was taken "under 
color of law." Adickes, supra, 398 U.S. at 150, 90 S.Ct. 1604. 
This element could be established by showing the presence of a 
policeman in the store. The Court ruled that the moving party 
"failed to fulfill its initial burden of demonstrating what is a 
critical element in this aspect of the case - that there was no 
policeman in the store." Id., 398 U.S. at 158, 90 S.Ct. at 1609. 
Since this burden had not been fulfilled, there was never any 
requirement for the other party to come forward with an affidavit 
properly asserting the presence of a policeman in the store. 
Id., 398 U.S. at 159, 90 S.Ct. at 1609. 
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Just as the Celotex opinion served to stop the language 
of the Adickes opinion from being construed too broadly, Justice 
White's concurring opinion serves to keep the language of the 
main Celotex opinion from being construed too broadly. He did so 
by stating: 
It is not enough to move for summary judgment 
without supporting the motion in any way or 
with a conciusory assertion that the plaintiff 
has no evidence to prove his case. Celotex, 
supra, 477 U.S. at 328, 106 S.Ct. at 2555 
(White, J., concurring). 
Farris berates McNair's reference to this concurring 
opinion on the basis pf its being nonbinding.^ However, when the 
Court is divided five to four, as in the Celotex case, the 
concurring opinion is very persuasive. It shows that it would 
have been decided the other way had the defendant moved "for 
summary judgment without supporting the motion in any way or with 
a conciusory assertion that the plaintiff has no evidence to 
prove his case. " 
Thus the construction Farris gives the majority opinion 
in Celotex is too broad, as we can see from the concurring 
opinion. 
Furthermore, as stated in the case of Harline v. Barker, 
912 P.2d 433 (Utah 1996), the Utah Supreme Court was not bound by 
Celotex, and specifically declined to adopt the reasoning of the 
majority opinion in that case. 
1
 On the other hand, it is interesting to note that 
Farris quotes from the syllabus. Farris Brief at 6-7. The 
syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court. See 
footnote Celotex, supra, 106 S.Ct. at 2549. 
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The governing Utah case law clearly reguires Farris to do more as 
the moving party than he did. 
The cases which do govern the interpretation of Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure as they pertain to summary judgment have 
been decided by Utah Supreme Court and have been extensively set 
forth in McNair's opening brief. 
For example, in the case of Walker Drug Co., Inc. v. La 
Sal Oil Co., 902 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1995), the Walkers had the 
burden at trial to prove that damage occurred within the 
limitations period. However, they had no such burden in response 
to a motion for summary judgment, where the moving party had not 
produced an affidavit showing that no damage had occurred within 
that period. 
The only time a moving party does not have to carry its 
initial burden is when the responding party provides evidence 
showing that it cannot sustain its burden at trial. This 
occurred in the fact situation described in the case of Harline 
v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433 (Utah 1996). Even though the nonmoving 
party had no duty to provide evidence, the court was not reguired 
to ignore the fact that the evidence voluntarily provided proved 
the party could not succeed at trial. 
As shown below, the evidence provided by McNair showed 
he had a good chance of success at trial, rather than precluding 
the possibility of that success. 
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2. THERE WERE THREE INDEPENDENTLY SUFFICIENT WAYS THAT 
McNAIR RAISED A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT REGARDING 
PERMANENT DISABILITY, 
McNair could rely on his pleadings. 
McNair alleged in his Complaint that "plaintiff was 
caused to and continues to suffer from, ... (c) Permanent 
disability." R. 2. 
Farris claims that this allegation in McNair's pleading 
was insufficient to raise an issue of fact, and thus summary 
judgment was proper. The basis for this claim is McNair's 
failure to follow the ruling in Celotex and comply with the 
requirement of Rule 56(e) URCP for the nonmoving party to go 
beyond the pleadings. Farris Brief at 8. 
It is true that the moving party in Celotex had not 
supplied affidavits, and it is true the nonmoving party could not 
rely just on the pleadings. However, that moving party was 
relying on much more than pleadings. As explained above, that 
party also relied on one or more "depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file," in addition to 
pleadings. 
Also as indicated above, whether Celotex and cases 
decided by the Utah Supreme Court can be reconciled or not is 
irrelevant. The Utah cases govern. That is why the Utah Court 
of Appeals referred the case of State v. Crosby, 302 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 36 (Utah 1996) to the Utah Supreme Court. The Court of 
Appeals was bound by a decision of the Utah Supreme Court 
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construing a rule of evidence, not by a later decision by the 
United States Supreme Court construing differently a comparable 
federal rule. 
In the case of Gadd v± 01sonf 685 P.2d 1041 (Utah 1984)f 
the moving party essentially relied solely on the oleadings. In 
fact, the motion was for dismissal on the pleadings. That party 
argued that once its answer was filed, negating the affirmative 
allegations of the other party, the nonmoving party could no 
longer rely solely on pleadings. The Utah Supreme Court figured 
that such an argument must have been based on an interpretation 
of Rule 56(e) URCP. Id. at 1045. 
However, the Supreme Court found Rule 56(e), properly 
construed, would be inapplicable where the moving party did not 
choose to support the motion with affidavits. 
When read in light of section (b) of Rule 56, 
which provides that the party moving for 
summary judgment may do so "with or without 
supporting affidavits," it is clear that the 
section (e) requirement that a party opposing 
the summary judgment motion file counter-
affidavits applies only when the moving party 
has elected to and has filed affidavits in 
support of the motion. If, as in this case, 
the moving party chooses not to or simply fails 
to file affidavits, section (e) is 
inapplicable. Id. 
Thus, since Farris did not support his motion with an 
affidavit averring that McNair did not have a permanent 
disability, McNair1s pleading that he did have a permanent 
disability was sufficient to raise or maintain that issue of 
fact. 
Farris cites the case of Dybowski v. Hahn, 775 P.2d 445 
9 
(Utah App. 1989) in support of his position that moving without 
affidavits would not in any way reduce McNair's burden in 
responding. Farris Brief at 9. However, the Dybowski opinion 
does not state whether affidavits were supplied in support of the 
motion. Additionally, the moving party relied on depositions 
which clearly showed the nonmoving party could not carry her 
burden at trial. 
On the other hand, Farris conspicuously left out 
McNair's testimony given in deposition concerning the extent and 
permanency of his disability. In addition to the pleadings, 
Farris relied solely on a conclusory statement that McNair did 
not suffer a "serious impairment of bodily function" (R. 66), a 
phrase derived from New York's statute, not Utah's. Compare New 
York Insurance Law, Section 5102(d) ("significant limitation of 
use of a body function or system") and Utah Code Section 31A-22-
309(1) (c) ("permanent disability"). 
And of course, Farris did not mention in his motion, and 
urged the trial court to disregard, the possibility that McNair 
would have additional testimony at trial as to his permanent 
disability. R. 162. 
McHair produced sufficient evidence of permanent disability. 
Farris claims that the following testimony in McNair's 
deposition is insufficient evidence of permanent disability: 
0. At the present time, Lee, do you have — 
what problems are you having with your foot? 
A. Extreme soreness. I have a problem with 
balance. The foot is weaker now. My leg is weaker, 
now, in fact, from being casted. I suppose that will 
come back. It is still very, very sore. It was 
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crushed and it was crushed slowly. The tire was 
turning and grinding on it. It is taking a lot longer 
to heal. It is not one simple injury, you know. Had I 
tripped and snapped a bone, you know, perhaps it would 
be simpler. 
R. 123.2 Farris Brief at 11. 
Farris discounts this testimony on the basis that a jury 
cannot find the existence of permanent disability in the absence 
of expert medical testimony. 
Farris first supports this position by citing three 
cases, Henley v. Rodeway Express, 699 S.W.2d 150 (Tenn. 1985), 
Employer1s Ins. Co. of Alabama v. Heath, 536 S.W.2d 341 (Tenn. 
1976), and Zoldas v. Louise Cab Corp., 489 N.Y.S.2d 468 (A.D.I 
Dept. 19 85). 
Two of these cases, Henley and Employer's Ins. Co., 
address the issue of permanent disability as it pertains to 
worker's compensation. It is not surprising that the law would 
be more stringent where the permanent disability itself justifies 
an award. This is in contrast with the instant matter, where a 
finding of permanent disability serves only to permit the 
presentation of evidence in support of an appropriate award. 
Had the legislature meant for a finding of permanent 
disability to require the same proof in the context of no-fault 
automobile insurance law, it had a pattern to follow in the form 
of the law pertaining to worker's compensation. The legislature 
2
 As indicated in Beltran v. Allan, 302 Utah Adv. Rep. 
23, 26 n.l (Utah App. 1996), excerots of a deposition presented 
to the court in memoranda are part of the record, regardless of 
whether the deposition was admitted or published. 
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did not choose to follow that pattern. 
Even in the context of worker's compensation, expert 
opinion is not required to show the extent of the disability. 
Employer1s Ins. Co., supra. 
In the third case, the Zoldas case, the moving parties 
fully supported their motion, marshalling all evidence showing 
the seriousness of the injury, and supplying the affidavit of 
their neurologist finding no abnormalities. Furthermore, that 
case bolsters its conclusion by specifically referring to the 
word "significant," which appears in New York's law, but not in 
Utah's. New York Insurance Law, Section 5102(d), Utah Code 
Section 31A-22-309(1)(c). 
However, even under New York law, the threshold of a 
"serious injury" may be proved at trial without expert testimony. 
An example of this is found in the case of D1Avolio v. 
Dictaphone Corp., 822 F.2d 5 (2nd Cir. 1987). In that case, no 
expert testimony was used. Rather, the plaintiffs used medical 
records and their own testimony. This sufficed to show the 
existence of a "serious injury" under New York law since the 
evidence proved there was a medically determined injury which 
substantially prevented performance of customary daily 
activities. 
Farris relies heavily on the case of Marino v. Rosen, 
561 N.Y.S.2d 280 (A.D.2 Dept. 1990). Farris Brief at 12. That 
case also turned on whether there was a "serious injury." Id_. at 
282. The "speculative" medical testimony had to do with whether 
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there had ever been a bone fracture in his leg. Furthermore, the 
injured oarty testified that he was fully engaged in a number of 
sports activities. 
In contrast, Farris has clearly broken more than one of 
McNair1s bones. There is no testimony that McNair has ever again 
been able to use his foot as before. To the contrary, McNair1s 
testimony is not only that his foot is extremely sore, but that 
it is weaker and causes him a problem with balance. R. 123. 
Finally, unlike in the Marino case, McNair has never had a chance 
to put on evidence at trial. 
Farris states that the criteria applicable to his motion 
are the same as those applicable to a motion for a directed 
verdict, citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 
106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Farris Brief at 5. This 
may well be true, once the moving party has met its initial 
burden, a matter which was assumed and was therefore not an issue 
in Anderson. Id., 477 U.S. at 250 n.4, 106 S.Ct. at 2511 n.4. 
As stated in Anderson, "If reasonable minds could differ 
as to the import of the evidence, however, a verdict should not 
be directed." ^d., 477 U.S. at 250-251, 106 S.Ct. at 2511. 
This same criterion was accepted in the case of Parker 
v. Nakaoka, 722 P.2d 1028 (Hawaii 1986): 
We hold that whether Appellee met the threshold 
requirement is for the jury to determine 
inasmuch as the facts relating to Appellee's 
injury are in dispute and reasonable minds 
could differ on whether Appellee sustained an 
injury which consists, in whole or in part, in 
a significant permanent loss of use of a part 
or function of her body. ^d. 722 P.2d at 1031. 
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The Utah Supreme Court discussed criteria for a directed 
verdict in the case of DeBry v. Cascade Enterprises, 879 P.2d 
1353, 1359 (Utah 1994): 
A directed verdict and a judgment n.o.v. 
are justified only if, after looking at the 
evidence and all reasonable inferences in a 
light most favorable to the nonmoving party, 
"the trial court concludes that there is no 
competent evidence which would support a 
verdict in his favor." [Citations.] A motion 
should be denied HI[i]f reasonable persons 
could reach differing conclusions on the issue 
in controversy.'" 
McNair stated that his foot was weaker and extremely 
sore, and that it was causing him a problem with balance. All of 
the reasonable favorable inferences that could be drawn from that 
statement had to be considered. Certainly a reasonable person 
hearing this testimony one year after the injury might conclude 
that McNair was suffering from a permanent disability. 
Anticipated expert testimony at trial could not be precluded. 
On pages 12 and 13 of his brief, Farris sets forth two 
bases for his assertion that McNair was wrong in claiming he had 
until the time of trial, rather than just until the time of 
pretrial, to prove compliance with the no-fault threshold. 
First, McNair1s counsel twice filed a certification of 
readiness for trial. 
Second, McNair did not supply additional evidence when 
moving for a new trial, although the vacated trial date had 
passed. 
Farris supports neither of these bases with case law, 
nor by reference to any applicable rule. 
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There is no rule or case law requiring that a party come 
forward with evidence before trial because that party filed a 
certification of readiness for trial. Although a partv may feel 
that it is ready for trial, and certifies as much, it is 
certainly not out of the ordinary for that party to continue its 
preparation. In the course of that preoaration it is also not 
uncommon for a oarty to realize that additional evidence must be 
gathered for presentation at trial. 
Only a properly supported motion for summary judgment 
requires the opposing party to supply, before trial, affidavits 
of witnesses oertaining to the issues adeauately addressed in the 
motion. Such affidavits are not required at pretrial merely 
because the oarty opposing the motion has certified its readiness 
for trial. 
Naturally, if it is clear at pretrial that the necessary 
evidence cannot be gathered for trial, a summary disposition of 
some sort probably will be approoriate. 
However, such was not the factual scenario in the 
instant matter. McNair's plan was to work to obtain additional 
pertinent evidence that very day following pretrial. R. 157, 
162. 
As to Farris's second reason regarding the passage of 
the date originally set for trial, a trial date is irrelevant if 
the trial is stricken. McNair has never been permitted to put on 
evidence at trial. McNair cannot be required to supply 
affidavits of witnesses pertaining to all issues on which he 
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bears the burden of proof merely because it is after the date on 
which the trial had originally been set. 
It may be true that a motion for a new trial based on 
newly discovered evidence would require support in the form of 
affidavits setting forth that additional evidence. However, a 
motion for a new trial based on an error of law would need no 
more evidentiary support than that which was before the court 
when the original ruling was made. 
Thus neither McNair's certifications of readiness for 
trial nor the passage of the date on which the trial had 
originally been set would justify precluding McNair's expert 
witnesses from testifying at trial. As indicated in the cases of 
Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980) and Berrett v. Denver 
and Rio Grande W. R., 830 P.2d 291 (Utah Apo. 1992), cert, 
denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992), a trial court generally only 
may exclude the testimony of an expert witness if the party 
seeking to call that witness has violated a court order. 
As stated in the case of Pifcho v. Brewer, 77 F.R.D. 356 
(M.D. Pa. 1977), pretrial may not be a substitute for trial. 
Only if there clearly will be no material issues of fact to be 
resolved at trial may judgment be ordered beforehand. 
In the instant matter, not only was McNair planning to 
testify at trial, but every effort was being made to have expert 
witnesses present at trial, which witnesses were expected to 
testify regarding the fact of oermanent disability as set forth 
in McNair's complaint. Thus the result of that trial, and 
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particularly the finding of a reasonable jury on that issue, was 
in no way predetermined. 
3. A DISMISSAL AT PRETRIAL FOR FAILURE TO MEET THE 
THRESHOLD REQUIREMENTS SHOULD NOT BE WITH PREJUDICE. 
Farris cites the case of Jepson v. State Dept. of 
Corrections, 846 P.2d 485 (Utah App. 1993) and claims it supports 
his position that the dismissal of McNair1s cause of action was 
appropriately with prejudice. Farris's rationale is that the 
Jepson case stands for the proposition that the time for proving 
a case should not be extended. Farris Brief at 14. 
It is true the Jepson case did not allow a claimant to 
wait to file an action until the no-fault threshold had been 
reached, regardless of the expiration of the limitations period 
as measured from the time the injury occurred. But the opinion 
acknowledged that the claimant would have more time after filing 
to reach the threshold, namely, until the trial. As indicated 
above, McNair was precluded from going to trial, that is, trial 
was never held. 
Furthermore, even if McNair had no chance of showing 
compliance with the no-fault threshold at trial, and dismissal 
was justified, a dismissal without prejudice would only extend 
the time for filing another year or until the end of the original 
limitations period. This would not "introduce considerable 
uncertainty into the law, as well as unduly prolonged controversy 
over many cases." Farris Brief at 14. 
As indicated, the Jepson case, part of which that quote 
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paraphrased, dealt with allowing an injured party to wait until 
the threshold requirements were met before filing an action. 
Clearly that could take an indeterminate number of years. That 
would indeed be "introducing considerable uncertainty into the 
law as well as unduly prolonging controversy over such cases." 
Jepson, supra , 846 P.2d at 488, quoting Carter v. Cross, 373 
So.2d 81, 83 (Fla. App. 1979), cert, denied, 385 So.2d 755 (Fla. 
1980). 
Since it would not lead to the horrors described by 
Farris, any pretrial dismissal for failure to meet the no-fault 
threshold should be without prejudice, especially where it 
appears that the threshold may be met before the expiration of 
the appropriate limitation period. 
This would comport with the general rule that courts 
favor deciding cases upon the merits. 
Dismissal with prejudice ... is a harsh 
and permanent remedy when it precludes a 
presentation of a plaintiff's claims on their 
merits. Our rules of procedure are intended to 
encourage the adjudication of disputes on their 
merits . Bonneville Tower v. Thompson Michie 
Assoc., 728 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah 1986). 
CONCLUSION 
Although each of the five following bases is sufficient 
to mandate reversal of the summary judgment, all of them apply to 
this case: 
1. Farris failed to carry his burden as the moving 
party in his motion for summary judgment. This burden was not 
met by McNair's response and thus the motion could not be 
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granted. 
2. Since Farris chose not to rely upon affidavits, and 
in fact did not rely upon anything other than pleadings and 
conclusory statements, McNair1s pleadings were sufficient to 
preclude summary judgment. 
3. McNair's deposition showed there existed a genuine 
issue of material fact regarding permanent disability. 
4. Since no pretrial or discovery order was entered or 
violated, McNair had until trial to present the expert testimony 
he anticipated. 
5. Dismissal should not have been with prejudice since 
the merits were not reached. 
Therefore, for each and all of the foregoing reasons, 
this Court should reverse the Order Granting Defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment, or in the alternative, it should reverse 
the Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial. The case 
should then be remanded for trial. In the alternative, the 
dismissal should be ruled to be without prejudice. 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
McNair does not object to Farrfs'p rrgaest for oral 
argument, and in fact, joins in respectfully requesting that oral 
argument be had in this case. 
DATED this Z j ~~ day of //^^J*~~ , 1996. 
LYNN F.HEWARD 
Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellant 
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